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"THE LAW OF THE CIRCUIT" REVISITED:
WHAT ROLE FOR MAJORITY RULE?
Arthur D. Hellman*
Two features define the ordinary course of adjudication in the federal
courts of appeals. First, cases are heard and decided by panels of three judges
selected at random from among a larger number of eligible judges. Second,
decisions of those panels are binding on later panels unless overruled by the
Supreme Court or by the court of appeals sitting en banc.
One consequence of these arrangements is that binding circuit law can be
established by a panel whose views do not represent the views of a majority
of the circuit's active judges. To be sure, a majority of the active judges can
always vote for rehearing en banc. But en banc rehearings place heavy
demands on judges' time, and they delay the disposition of appeals. No court
of appeals grants en banc rehearing in more than a tiny fraction of the cases
decided on the merits. In all other cases, the panel decision stands as the last
word within the circuit, even if a majority of active judges would have reached
a contrary result.
It is easy to see why this state of affairs would arouse concern within the
legal community. The principle of majority rule is deeply embedded in
American institutions and indeed in popular consciousness. And the stakes are
high. In earlier times, "the law of the circuit" did not matter all that much,
because we could assume that important issues of federal law would be
resolved by the United States Supreme Court. But today, with the Supreme
Court taking fewer than eighty cases a year from all federal and state courts,
that assumption no longer holds.' Thus, the decision of a three-judge panel is
likely to retain its status as binding precedent within the circuit for an extended
period of time, perhaps for as long as the issue remains relevant.
Two prominent appellate judges have offered competing perspectives on
the prospect of minority control of circuit law on an important issue. Former
Chief Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg of the District of Columbia Circuit has
endorsed the premise that "the majority should rule."2 The premise is

*

1.

2.

Professor of Law and Sally Ann Semenko Endowed Chair, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
See Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. CT. REv. 403 (1997).
In the 2007 Term the Court heard only seventy cases, including one within its original jurisdiction.
One of the appellate cases was dismissed by stipulation of the parties after argument, leaving a
plenary docket of sixty-nine cases.
Douglas H. Ginsburg & Donald Falk, The CourtEn Banc: 1981-1990, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1008,
1034 (1991).
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grounded on the conception of the three-judge panel as "the agent of the full
court."3 This means that "the decisions of the panels ideally should reflect the
views of the court as a whole, or where that is not possible because the court
is divided, come as close as possible to that ideal by reflecting the views of a
majority of the court." By the same token, "if a majority [of the active judges]
...
believe that the panel almost surely has erred, then that is properly reason
enough to trigger en banc review."
This also appears to have been the position of the Commission on
Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, known as the White
Commission after its chairman, the late Supreme Court Justice Byron White.
In explaining the virtues of its most controversial structural recommendation,
the Commission emphasized that, under its proposed approach, "issues of
exceptional importance will be determined by all of the judges for whom the
decision speaks." 4
In contrast, former Chief Judge James R. Browning of the Ninth Circuit
has championed an approach that he refers to as "panel autonomy."5 In his
view, "it is not the purpose of the en banc process to assure that cases are
decided in the way the majority of the whole court would have decided them."
He explains:
[This approach] would undercut the basic statutory direction that the court is
to function in three-judge panels. It would diminish the sense of
responsibility of three-judge panels. It would limit the opportunity for a
minority of the court to contribute to the development of the law, and in the
long run would undermine the stability of the court.
Thus, "[i]t is not a ground for en banc review that the majority of the court
disagrees with a panel result." Rather, intervention by the majority is
warranted only "to deal with conflicts between panels or to consider cases of
truly exceptional importance."
Taking these competing perspectives as its starting-point, this article
examines the role of majority rule in the development and application of the
law within the federal judicial circuits. 6 The analysis is in three parts. Part I
clears away some underbrush and narrows the focus of the inquiry. Part II

3.
4.
5.
6.

Id.at 1011 (emphasis added).
Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, Final Report 51 (1998).
Annual Judicial Conference, Second Judicial Circuit of the United States, 106 F.R.D. 103, 162 (1984)
(remarks of Judge James R. Browning) [hereinafter Browning Remarks].
The article is not a comprehensive examination of en banc practice. For a good introduction, see
Stephen L. Wasby, The Supreme Courtand the Courts ofAppeals En Bancs, 33 McGEORGE L. REV.
17, 19-36 (2001).
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takes up an aspect of majority rule that Judge Ginsburg ignores-the political
aspect. Part III points to some specific circumstances in which the majority of
active judges should be particularly willing to correct a panel decision that
they believe is erroneous.
I. NARROWING THE FOCUS OF DISPUTE: EN BANC REVIEW IN
CONTEXT
The framework for considering the role of majority rule in the federal
courts of appeals is established by statute and by Enabling Act rule. The
statute is section 46(c) of Title 28, and it provides: "Cases and controversies
shall be heard and determined by a court or panel of not more than three
judges... unless a hearing or rehearing before the court in banc is ordered
by a majority of the circuit judges of the circuit who are in regular active
service." This statutory directive is supplemented by Rule 35 of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure (FRAP), which states: "An en banc hearing or
rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered unless: (1) en banc
consideration is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court's
decisions; or (2) the proceeding involves a question of exceptional
importance."
These provisions make clear that hearing and decision by three-judge
panels are the norm, and that en banc hearing should occur only rarely. How
rarely? That is the subject of the disagreement between Judge Ginsburg and
Judge Browning. But the scope of the disagreement is narrower than some of
the judges' rhetoric might suggest.
First, for the great bulk of court of appeals cases, the debate over the
importance of majority rule is completely irrelevant, because the outcome will
be the same no matter which judges sit on the panel that hears the case.
Almost fifty years ago, Judge Henry J. Friendly observed that the
majority-probably the vast majority-of cases in his court (the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals) could be decided only one way, since "the law and its
application alike are plain."7 Today, the percentage is even higher. To begin
with, 40% or more of all federal appeals are filed by pro se litigants.8 Most of

7.

8.

Henry J. Friendly, Reactions of a Lawyer-Newly Become Judge, 71 YALE L. J. 218, 222 (1961)
(quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 164 (1921)). Judge
Friendly was quoting Judge Cardozo's description of the work of the New York Court of Appeals,
but the context makes clear that he believed that the characterization was also applicable to his own
court.
See, e.g., 2006 Judicial Business of the United States Courts, tbl. B-9, http://www.uscourts.gov
/judbus2006/contents.html (43% of appeals filed in SY 2006). In the Fourth Circuit, more than half
of the appeals were pro se cases. Id.
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these pro se cases raise arguments that are foreclosed by precedent or
otherwise without merit if not actually frivolous. Hundreds, perhaps
thousands, of additional appeals challenge criminal convictions or sentences
on grounds that are plainly insubstantial. Indeed, in 2007, one court of
appeals-the Fifth Circuit-issued more than 900 dispositions that used identical
language to reject "arguments that are foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v.
United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998)."' In cases like these, the outcome plainly
does not depend on which judges sit on the panel, and no judge would even
consider the possibility of en banc review under any standard.
At the other end of the spectrum, there is little disagreement that en banc
hearing is appropriate when two or more panel decisions have created conflict
or disarray in the law of the circuit. The "uniformity" criterion of FRAP 35
comes into play in three kinds of situations, each involving a somewhat
different dynamic within the court. First, a litigant or the three-judge panel
assigned to a case may discover an existing conflict between decisions of
previous panels.' ° Indeed, if the conflict is identified early enough in the
appellate process, the three-judge panel may call for an initial hearing en banc
rather than issuing its own decision.11 Second, a newly issued panel opinion
may create a conflict with a published precedent of the circuit. 2 Such
conflicts may be identified by a petition for rehearing en banc or by an offpanel judge. As one might expect, judges will often disagree about whether
a particular decision does create a conflict. But none are likely to challenge
the appropriateness of en banc review when a conflict does exist. Finally, en
banc review may be warranted when members of the court identify two or
more circuit decisions that can be reconciled on their facts but that include

9.

10.

11.

12.

See, e.g., United States v. Moreno-Garza, 259 F. App'x 636 (5th Cir. 2007) (Reavley, Barksdale, &
Garza, JJ.); United States v. Corona-Robles, 239 F. App'x 912 (5th Cir. 2007) (DeMoss, Dennis, &
Owen, JJ); United States v. Ramos-Gonzalez, 234 F. App'x 274 (5th Cir. 2007) (Jolly, Clement, &
Owen, JJ.); United States v. Perez-Gil, 224 F. App'x 407 (5th Cir. 2007) (Jones, Higginbotham, &
Clement, JJ.); United States v. Trevino-Davila, 222 F. App'x 278 (5th Cir. 2007) (King, Wiener, &
Owen, JJ.); United States v. Duron-Moreno, 217 F. App'x 332, 5th Cir. 2007) (Reavley, Jolly, &
Benavides, JJ.).
By way of example: in United States v. Castillo, 464 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 2006), the panel majority
relied on one line of circuit precedent; the dissent rested on another-but acknowledged that "our cases
are not entirely consistent." Id. at 992 (Bybee, J. dissenting). The full court granted rehearing en banc
and overruled the decisions that the panel majority had embraced. United States v. Jacobo Castillo,
496 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 2007).
For example, in UnitedStates v. Lopez, 484 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc), the court "took [the]
case en bane without a three-judge panel decision in order to bring consistency to our circuit law with
respect to the scope and meaning of the pertinent provisions of" a federal statute. Id. at 1188. The
court overruled two of its decisions. Id. at 1200 n. 17.
For discussion of one such case, see Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and Jurisprudence: The Theory
and Practiceof Precedent in the LargeAppellate Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 541, 567 n.99 (1989).
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language or reasoning that creates confusion or uncertainty in the law of the
circuit. "
The extent to which en banc hearings are needed to maintain uniformity
within the circuit will depend on other practices and procedures followed by
the particular court. Of particular interest here is the Seventh Circuit's practice
under Circuit Rule 40(e), described by Judge Kanne in his contribution to this
symposium. 14 Under Rule 40(e), a panel may directly overrule a prior decision
if the panel circulates a draft opinion to all active judges and "a majority of
them do not vote to rehear en banc the issue of whether the [new] position
should be adopted." The District of Columbia Circuit and the Second Circuit
occasionally follow a similar practice, albeit without formal authorization by
rule. In other circuits, en banc review is the device used to restore or maintain
consistency among panel decisions.
When we put aside the cases at the two ends of the spectrum-the appeals
that can come out only one way and the intracircuit conflicts-what is left?
What is left is a substantial number of appeals whose outcome is not
foreclosed and which could be decided either way without creating a conflict
with circuit precedent. But not all such cases are plausible candidates for en
banc review. En banc review is a real possibility only when two further
conditions are satisfied: the panel decision has importance-practical or
precedential-beyond that of the ordinary appeal; and the panel appears to have
decided the case wrongly from the perspective of the active judges. When
both of these circumstances exist, a choice between the competing
philosophies of Judge Ginsburg and Judge Browning may well determine
whether en banc review will in fact be granted.
I do not want to overstate the difference between the two approaches.
Judge Ginsburg appears to acknowledge that it not necessary for the majority
to review every panel decision that a majority may believe to be erroneous;
rather, the question is whether the apparent error "is grave enough to warrant
the cost of correction."' 5 And Judge Browning voted for en banc review in
some cases that did not appear to present intracircuit conflicts or issues of
"exceptional importance.' ' 16 But even if there are only a handful of cases in

13.

14.
15.
16.

For example, in Odom v. Microsoft Corp, 486 F.3d 541 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc), the court noted that
"[t]he confusion in our precedents [on the meaning of an associated-in-fact enterprise under RICO]
has caused difficulties for the district courts in this circuit." Id. at 550. The court took the case en
banc "to correct and clarify our case law." Id. at 549.
Michael S. Kanne, The "Non-BancEn Banc ": Seventh CircuitRule 40(e) and the Law of the Circuit,
32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 611 (2008).
Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 2, at 1041.
Iam grateful to Professor Stephen L. Washy for providing data on Judge Browning's votes on en banc
calls during the years 1982 through 1985.
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which the choice between the competing philosophies will determine judges'
votes on an en banc call, those will be, almost by definition, cases whose
outcomes matter. Sometimes the panel decision, if allowed to stand, will
establish a precedent that will require judges to decide other cases on the basis
of a legal rule that they would have rejected if they had sat on the panel. Or
the consequences may be more immediate: the decision will require
governmental or private actors to alter the course of action that they would
otherwise follow.
II. MAJORITY RULE: THE POLITICAL ASPECT
Judge Ginsburg's article is a scholarly and detailed treatment of its
subject. He outlines the history of en banc review starting with the creation of
the courts of appeals in 1891, and (in an appendix) he gives a detailed account
of all cases that the D.C. Circuit voted to hear en banc during the period
1981-1991.
But there is one striking omission from his discussion.
Throughout, he treats "the majority" as an abstraction. He appears to assume
that "the majority" is composed of the active judges who just happen to agree
on the proper outcome of a particular case-and who just happen to outnumber
the active judges who take the opposing view.
Judge Browning provides a very different perspective on majority rule.
His analysis rests on two propositions. First, at any given time the "majority"
in a court of appeals will be composed of judges appointed either by
Republican Presidents or by Democratic Presidents. Second, judges appointed
by Republican Presidents will share "ideological roots" that differ from those
of Democratic appointees; as a consequence, a Republican-dominated majority
will tend to decide cases one way, and a Democratic-dominated majority will
tend to decide cases the other way. Judge Browning provides a remarkably
candid account of how these propositions played out on his own court:
Fifteen of the 23 judges of our court of appeals were appointed by President
Carter over a three-year period. Seven of the remaining eight were appointed
by Republican administrations. Quite understandably, political leaders seek
to select judges who share their point of view. As a result of the addition of
the newjudges during President Carter's administration, a rather conservative
court of appeals was converted into a rather liberal one.
This year [1984], President Reagan appointed one judge to our court. He
may appoint three more by January 1. If he is reelected, he will appoint two
more for sure and possibly as many as five, including three to fill vacancies
that are likely to occur as active judges qualify for senior status. In short,
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President Reagan may appoint a total of eight judges to our court in the next
two [sic] years. If he does that, the ideological majority will shift again. 7

Based on this analysis, Judge Browning concluded that frequent use of en banc
rehearing to foster majority rule will tend to produce a "loss of institutional
stability, because periodic shifts in the ideological roots of the majority may
produce sharp and unsettling shifts in the law."'
Judge Browning's first point can hardly be questioned. Commentator Ed
Whelan has helpfully summarized the alignments in the regional circuits as of
January 1, 2008:"9
Of the 12 regional appeals courts, five (Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and
D.C.) currently have substantial majorities of Republican appointees, three
(First, Sixth, and Eleventh) have narrow majorities ofRepublican appointees,
two (Third and Fourth") are tied, one (Second) has a narrow majority of
Democratic appointees, and one (Ninth) has a substantial majority of
Democratic appointees.
But the Republican domination of eight out of twelve circuits could easily
change if a Democrat is elected as President in 2009 and reelected in 2013:
[Even the circuits] with a substantial majority ofRepublican appointees could
be expected to swing Democratic with a Democratic president over the next
eight years. For example, the Fifth Circuit currently has twelve Republican
appointees versus four Democratic appointees. But eight of those twelve
were appointed by President Reagan, and six of those eight range in age from
70 to 79 (and one of George H.W. Bush's appointees is also in his 70s). If
those six are replaced by Democratic appointees, the Fifth Circuit would
swing to a 10-6 majority of Democratic appointees.2 '

17.

18.
19.
20.
21.

Browning Remarks, supranote 5, at 161. In fact, President Reagan appointed a total of ten judges
to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals during his two terms, but this was possible only because
Congress created five new judgeships for the court in 1984. President George H.W. Bush appointed
four judges, and the court had a Republican majority for about a decade, until President Clinton's
second term.
Id. at 162.
Ed Whelan, Viewing JudicialConfirmations Through Rose-Colored Glasses?, NATIONAL REVIEW
ONLINE (blog entry Jan. 3, 2008), http://bench.nationalreview.com/.
"Like the Federal Judicial Center database, I'm counting Roger Gregory, who was recess-appointed
by President Clinton and then, in an act of unrequited generosity, appointed to a lifetime position by
President Bush, as a Democratic appointee." Id.
n.*.
Id.
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Judge Browning's second proposition-that appointees of Republican
Presidents tend to vote differently than Democratic appointees-may not be
self-evident, but it is supported by a large body of empirical research. Indeed,
the academic researchers generally use the same pair of labels that Judge
Browning did; they characterize decisions as "liberal" or conservative." In
brief, "decisions supportive of 'underdogs' such as civil rights claimants, the
criminally accused, unions, and so forth, are liberal, while conservative
decisions include pro-business, pro-government, pro-employer, pro-creditor,
and other outcomes favoring the 'haves' over the 'have-nots."'' 22 Three
scholars have recently summarized the empirical research on the link between
the party of the appointing President and a judge's votes:
Numerous researchers have investigated the hypothesis that Republicanappointedjudges reach systematically more conservative outcomes than those
produced by Democratic appointees. Defining "liberal" and "conservative"
outcomes in the manner described above, the researchers have obtained
results that are consistent and robust in the civil rights and liberties context.
Sunstein, Schkade, and Ellman find that politics as measured by the party of
the appointing President explains voting behavior in abortion cases as well
as those involving capital punishment; Staudt finds a relationship in cases
involving constitutional challenges to government spending on religious
activities; Rowland and Carp uncover a strong relationship in race
discrimination and religion cases; Cross and Tiller find a relationship in
environmental law controversies; Gates and Cohen find Republicanappointed Justices are far more likely to vote against the plaintiff in racial
equality cases; Aliotta finds a correlation in the context of equal protection
claims; and the list goes on and on.23
To be sure, the authors acknowledge that scholars "find no relationship
between political preferences and voting behavior" in economic
controversies.24 But they suggest that this may be the result of "questionable
characterizations" of case outcomes resulting from overly simplistic coding
rules.25 In any event, the numerous issues that do fit the pattern are more than
sufficient not only to support Judge Browning's second proposition but also
to underscore how much is at stake if he is persuasive in the conclusion he
draws.

22.
23.
24.
25.

Nancy Staudt, Lee Epstein & Peter Wiedenbeck, The IdeologicalComponentofJudging in the Taxing
Context, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1797, 1801 (2006).
Id. at 1806 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 1807.
Id. at 1813.

2008]

"The Law of the Circuit" Revisited

Judge Browning's fear is that overly aggressive use of the en banc power
by a court of appeals majority may produce "sharp and unsettling shifts in the
law" within the circuit as control shifts from one party's appointees to the
other's. We need not look far to find an example of precisely this
phenomenon. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is composed of
five members who are appointed by the President for staggered terms of five
years. Over the last four decades, the course of adjudication by the Board has
been marked by frequent reversals of precedent as majority control has shifted
from appointees of one President to appointees of a new President of the
opposite party.26 The "Kennedy Board" overruled decisions of the
"Eisenhower Board;" the "Nixon Board" overruled the "Kennedy Board," and
so to the present, with the George W. Bush Board overturning decisions of the
Clinton Board. 27 Robert J. Battista, who served as chairman of the NLRB until
late 2007, recently presented a candid and illuminating account of this process:
[Changes in the law] can come about because of social and economic
developments, or because of differing perceptions of what is right and just.
With respect to the differing perceptions, it must be recognized that Congress
established an agency whose Members would serve relatively short and
staggered terms. Obviously, the Board majority would reflect, to some
degree, the governing philosophy of the appointing President. Purists may
gnash their teeth at this, but it was part of the congressional design.
This is not to say that Congress intended that one party would blindly
overrule the precedents of the other party. [All] holdings must be within the
fundamental principles set out in the Act, and all changes must be explained.
The Board is an administrative agency, charged with not only an
interpretative, but a policy-making role. It is not an Article III court and thus
the doctrine of stare decisis does not strictly apply. However, all responsible
Members recognize the value ofhaving stability, predictability, and certainty

26.
27.

See Arthur D. Hellman, GettingIt Right: Panel Errorand the En Banc Process in the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, 34 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 425, 466 n. 150 (2000).
See, e.g., Charles J. Morris, The Casefor UnitaryEnforcement of FederalLaborLaw-Concerning
a Specialized Article III Court and the Reorganizationof Existing Agencies, 26 Sw. L.J. 471, 477

(1972) (noting "tendency for certain Board policies to make pendulum-type swings which reflect
shifts in national political administrations); Samuel Estreicher, Policy Oscillationat the Labor Board,
A Pleafor Rulemaking, 37 ADMIN. L. J. 163, 163-66 n. 1 (1985) (listing 37 decisions by "Reagan
Board" overruling precedents); Michael D. Goldhaber, Is NLRB in a Pro-LaborMood?, NAT'L L.J.,

Oct. 9, 2000, at B 1 (noting that Board, controlled by Democrats, issued 22 decisions overruling
precedent in two-year period); Special Report, 176 LRR 330, 333 (2005) (reporting observation by
NLRB member that Board "has reversed precedent in about eight or nine cases" since Republican
appointees became a majority).
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in the law. But, if a Member honestly believes that a prior precedent no
longer makes sense, and that a change would be within the fundamental
principles described above, he/she can vote to change the law. To be sure,
the values of stare decisis counsel against an onslaught of changes. But

prudently exercised, change is proper and indeed was envisioned by
Congress.28

There is some ambivalence in this description, but the overall thrust is
clear. Although Chairman Battista acknowledges that the Board "is not an
Article III court and thus [that] the doctrine of stare decisis does not strictly
apply," he also emphasizes "the value of having stability, predictability, and
certainty in the law." Nevertheless, he points out that "the structure set up by
Congress" invariably and properly leads to "changes in the law" when a newly
constituted majority votes in accordance with "the philosophic views of the
President" who appointed the members.29
I am not suggesting that aggressive use of en banc review by the federal
courts of appeals would lead to overruling of precedents or repudiation of
doctrine on the scale seen in the NLRB. The courts of appeals are Article III
courts, and the doctrine of stare decisis does apply. But I do believe that
zealous application of the "panel as agent" theory espoused by Judge Ginsburg
could result in a dynamic similar to that described by Chairman Battista.
Consider Judge Ginsburg's elaboration of the agency theory:
Under this approach, the full court is obliged to ensure (to the extent
practical) that each case is correctly decided. Delegating to a panel the
responsibility for an initial decision does not relieve the full court of its own
responsibility for the ultimate decision in the case. Accordingly, nonpanelists
should not shrink (again, to the extent practical) from correcting a panel error,
even if the case is important only to the parties-that is, it sets no significant
precedent for the court.3"
Presumably off-panel judges should be even less reluctant to "correct[] a panel
error" when the decision does "set[] a significant precedent for the court."
And they could justify their approach by saying, somewhat as Chairman
Battista does in the NLRB context, that "the structure set up by [the
Constitution]" invariably and properly leads to "changes in the law" when a

28.
29.
30.

Robert J. Battista, The NLRB at 70: Its Pastand Its Future,58th NYU Annual Conference on Labor
(May 20, 2005) http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/press/releases/chairman_052005 nyu speech.pdf.
See, id. at 14 ("a Board majority will generally reflect the philosophic views of the President" who
appointed the members).
Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 2, at 1011-12.
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newly constituted majority votes in accordance with "the philosophic views
of the President" who appointed the judges.3
Of course, as Judge Ginsburg recognizes, practical considerations limit
the number of panel decisions that the full court can review. But, apart from
practical considerations, he believes that the full court "can and should
convene en banc whenever the majority believes that an error is grave enough
to warrant the cost of correction, regardless of whether the case would fall
under a neutral category of exceptional importance. 3 2 Whole-hearted
embrace of that position could easily lead to the "sharp and unsettling shifts
in the law" that Judge Browning warns against.
It is noteworthy that court of appeals majorities have generally exercised
restraint in seizing cases from three-judge panels even when appointees of one
party enjoy strong numerical dominance within the circuit. One exception was
the Fourth Circuit for a brief period in the mid- 1990s; the conservative judges
who constituted the court's majority made vigorous use of their power to
overturn liberal panel decisions.33 (A similar phenomenon could be seen in the
Fifth Circuit.) But the pattern became less prominent toward the end of the
decade, and even before the conservatives lost their hold on the court they
apparently decided that greater restraint was in order.
III. EN BANC REVIEW AND CORRECTION OF PANEL ERROR
In arguing for a robust role for en banc review, Judge Ginsburg
emphasizes the principle that "the majority should rule." 34

Based on the

concerns expressed by Judge Browning, I would be reluctant to give such
heavy weight to the principle of majority control or to the "panel as agent"
theory that underlies it. Still, I must acknowledge that the principle of
majority rule resonates deeply with Americans, even in the context of appellate
adjudication. In any event, there is another line of justification that points in
the same direction. Specifically, en banc review will often be warranted to
combat the perception (and indeed the reality) that the fateful consequences of

31.

32.
33.
34.

Judge (now Chief Judge) Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit has explicitly linked judges' voting
behavior with the philosophies of the Presidents who appointed them. He said: "[Federal] judges are
appointed by the President, at least in part because of ideology, and I see nothing wrong with relying
on ideology to some extent in deciding cases that have no clear legal answer." Alex Kozinski & Fred
Bernstein, Clerkship Politics, GREEN BAG, Autumn 1998 at 57, 61. Judge Kozinski was careful to
add: "It's when you are moved by ideology to ignore the law in order to reach a result you like that
you step out of bounds."
Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 2, at 1041.
See Phil Zarone, Agenda Setting in the Courts of Appeals: The Effect of Ideology on En Banc
Rehearings, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 157 (2000).
See Ginsberg & Falk supra note 2, at 1034.
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a court decision have come about simply because'of "the luck of the draw" in
the assignment of the case to a particular panel. It is useful to look separately
at panel decisions that are important as precedent and those that stand out
because of their immediate practical consequences.
As already noted, in the absence of a threat to intracircuit uniformity,
FRAP 35 states that en banc review should be granted only when the case
presents "a question of exceptional importance." From the standpoint of the
system of precedent, "exceptional importance" depends on two factors: first,
the number of pending or future cases in which the decision might be invoked;
and, second, the extent to which the decision is likely to control outcomes.
The first factor is illustrated by a recent Sixth Circuit case in which a
dissenting opinion joined by four judges expressed "befuddlement" at the
majority's vote to grant en banc rehearing. 35 The dissent argued that the
parties' briefs pointed only to "a rather pedestrian disagreement" as to whether
a state habeas petitioner "had offered sufficient evidence to establish a tacit
agreement" between the prosecution and a key witness that would trigger the
prosecutor's disclosure obligations under Brady v. Maryland.36 The en banc
majority responded that the panel decision "would create a new definition of
Brady material and a new legal rule broadly applicable in federal criminal
prosecutions as well as habeas proceedings., 37 Thus, if the panel decision
remained as binding precedent, "the impact would be enormous.""
The en banc majority may well have been correct in its estimate of the
number of cases in which the panel's decision might be invoked as precedent.
As the opinion emphasized, "prosecutors . . . frequently use cooperating
witnesses in criminal trials," and often these witnesses will receive some sort
of favorable treatment after the trial even in the absence of an explicit
agreement.39 But that does not necessarily mean that the panel decision would
have the "enormous" impact that the majority foresaw. Under our system of
precedent, no case stands alone.4" The Bell ruling would be read against the
background of existing case law on Brady disclosure obligations-and the Bell
decision's contribution would be determined not by the Bell panel but by later

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Bell v. Bell, 512 F.3d 223,250 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Moore, J., dissenting). A fifth judge agreed
that en banc rehearing was' improvidently granted.
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Bell, 512F.3d at 231 n.2.
Id.
Id. at 234 n.6.
Or as famously said by Karl Llewellyn (complete with exclamation point), "no case can have a
meaning by itselfl" KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 48 (Oceana Publications, Inc. 1960)
(1930).
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panels.4 Further, the more aberrant a decision, the more likely it is that other
panels will be able to distinguish it in a credible and cogent way, particularly
by putting it in the context of other relevant precedents of the circuit and of the
Supreme Court. Thus, no matter how broadly the panel wrote its opinion, the
ruling would not be the last word within the circuit. On the contrary, in all
likelihood the decision would wind up as no more than one small thread in the
court's elaborately woven Brady jurisprudence.42
Does this mean that the Sixth Circuit majority was wrong in voting to
grant en banc rehearing in Bell? Not necessarily. As the majority saw the
case, the panel decision would have opened the door to numerous Brady
claims that would otherwise be dismissed-and that should be dismissed.
Under those circumstances, there is some economy in correcting the panel's
error immediately rather than awaiting the evolutionary processes of law over
time. But it is also true that the broad applicability of the precedent would
have meant that other panels would have had the opportunity to qualify or
limit the panel's rule sooner rather than later.
The cost-benefit calculus is very different when a panel decision is
important not as precedent but because of its immediate practical
consequences. In that context, the concern that robust enforcement of majority
rule will lead to "sharp and unsettling shifts in the law" becomes irrelevant.
Nor can it be argued that en banc review is unnecessary because the decision,
though aberrant, will be cabined over time. By definition, the consequences
flow from the court's judgment, not the rationale or doctrine that supports it.
The evolutionary processes of law over time will do nothing to mitigate those
consequences. For these reasons, I believe that the active judges should
readily grant en banc rehearing if they believe that the consequences are
undesirable and the decision erroneous.
Even in this setting, not all panel decisions stand on the same footing. I
believe that two kinds of panel decisions deserve particularly close scrutiny by
off-panel judges: those that interfere with the outcome of democratic
processes and those that would impose significant burdens on a major actor in
the private sector. When such decisions appear to be the product of "the luck

41.

42.

To draw again on Llewellyn, "the true rule of [a] case" is "what it will be made to stand for by another
later court," because a court "[can] decide only what was before it," and a later court can decide that
the dispute before the earlier court "called ...for the application of a much narrower rule" than the
earlier court thought. Id.at 53.
In 2007, the Ninth Circuit granted en banc rehearing in a fact-specific Brady case where the panel
found no constitutional violation. CompareUnited States v. Jernigan, 451 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2006)
(2-1 decision affirming conviction), with United States v. Jemigan, 492 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2007)
(en banc) (13-2 decision reversing conviction). Nothing in the en banc majority opinion suggests that
the case had any precedential importance, and indeed the facts were quite unusual.
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of the draw," the effect is to convey the impression that momentous
consequences have been required not by the rule of law but by the caprices of
men. Even if a majority of the active judges ultimately decide that the panel
was correct, the ruling will have a legitimacy that the panel's decision lacks.43
A good illustration of the first category is the Ninth Circuit panel
decision that enjoined the state of California from carrying out a special
election-scheduled in accordance with the state's constitution-to recall
Governor Gray Davis. 44 The panel opinion was issued on a Monday morning.
On Friday of the same week, the active judges voted to rehear the case en
banc. The case was argued orally the following Monday, and on the very next
day the en banc court issued its unanimous decision that allowed the election
to go forward as scheduled.45 It is unfortunate that the aberrant panel ruling
caused even temporary disruption of the democratic process in California, but
the full court's speedy action minimized the harm and exemplified the proper
functioning of the en banc procedure. 6
The second category is illustrated by another Ninth Circuit case, Dukes
v. Wal-Mart, Inc. 47 The district court certified a Title VII class action
putatively brought on behalf of all current and former female Wal-Mart
employees, "both salaried and hourly, with a range of positions, who are or
were employed at one or more of Wal-Mart's 3,400 stores across the
country. ' , 48 The class was estimated to exceed 1.5 million individuals, and the
complaint sought billions of dollars in monetary relief. The complaint also
asked the court to issue an injunction requiring Wal-Mart to make
"fundamental changes to the manner in which [it] makes its pay and
promotions decisions nationwide."4 9 A two-judge panel majority affirmed the
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I recognize that concerns about "the luck of the draw" may also be aroused by routine decisions
whose consequences are modest. But the higher stakes and the higher visibility of the kinds of cases
discussed in the text make the threat to legitimacy more potent.
Sw.Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2003).
Sw. Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
A similar case is Padilla v. Lever, 429 F. 3d 910 (9th Cir. 2005). A divided three-judge panel
interpreted a provision of the Voting Rights Act as requiring that recall petitions-petitions initiated,
circulated and paid for by private proponents of a recall--must be provided to voters in certain
minority languages as well as in English. The panel majority was composed of one circuit judge and
one district judge sitting by designation. The dissenting judge-a Jimmy Carter appointee-pointed
out the "perverse" consequences of the panel majority's ruling: "rather than opening the electoral
process in accord with the intent of the Voting Rights Act, [the decision would] have a tendency to
close it." Id.at 924-25 (Canby, J., dissenting). The en banc court rejected the panel holding by a vote
of 14 to 1,with only the author of the panel decision in dissent. Padilla v. Lever, 463 F. 3d 1046 (9th
Cir. 2006) (en banc).
509 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2007) (as amended).
Id. at 1177.
Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 171 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
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class certification over a powerful dissent asserting that the district court's
order "violates Rule 23, likely deprives many women who have been
discriminated against of the money they are entitled to, and deprives Wal-Mart
of its constitutional rights to jury trial and due process of law."5 °
There can be no doubt that if the suit is allowed to proceed, the effect on
a major national corporation would be enormous-far greater than the effect on
criminal prosecutions of the panel decision in the Bell habeas case. Wal-Mart
has asked the Ninth Circuit to rehear the Dukes case en banc. The Ninth
Circuit should do so, because the far-reaching consequences of the panel
decision should not be imposed on Wal-Mart-and on the national
economy-based on the random selection of Judges Pregerson and Hawkins for
the three-judge panel." In this respect the decision is the private-sector
counterpart to the California recall case.
IV. CONCLUSION
The choice between the competing views of majority rule is not, of
course, the only factor that will determine how a judge votes on whether to
grant en banc rehearing in a particular case. For example, a judge might vote
"no" on the theory that the case is "obviously" destined for the Supreme Court
and that en banc review will only delay final resolution of the issue. 2 Unique
considerations may come into play in the Ninth Circuit, where en banc cases
are heard and decided by a subset of the judges who vote on rehearing. 3 En
banc review is rare enough in all circuits that it is simply not possible to isolate
the effect of any particular variable, let alone to make valid cross-circuit
comparisons. My purpose here has not been to analyze whether en banc
practices conform to one theory or the other but rather to establish a
framework that will help scholars to assess what the courts have done and
perhaps assist judges in shaping their own approach to voting on en banc calls.
Judge Browning is persuasive in arguing that as long as a new decision
does not conflict with binding precedent, three-judge panels should be given
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Dukes, 509 F.3d at 1193 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
Judge Pregerson was also the author of the panel opinion in Padilla v. Lever, discussed supra note
46, and was the senior judge on the three-judge panel that ordered a halt to the California
gubernatorial recall election.
For discussion of this point, see Wasby, supra note 6, at 33-36. I put "obviously" in quotation marks
because the Supreme Court does not always act in accordance with judges' expectations.
All active judges are entitled to vote on whether to rehear a case en banc, but if a majority votes in
the affirmative, the case will be heard by a "limited en bane court" composed of the chief judge and
ten judges chosen at random from among the other active judges. See 9th Cir. Local R. 35-3 (as
amended July 1, 2007); Hellman, supra note 26, at 435.
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wide leeway to resolve legal issues on which there is no controlling authority.
When only precedential importance is at stake, aberrant decisions can
generally be cabined over time without great harm to the system. Moreover,
aggressive use of majority power risks creating a pattern of "sharp and
unsettling shifts in the law" as Republican majorities take over from
Democratic majorities and vice versa.
In contrast, en banc review can easily be justified when a panel decision
interferes with the outcome of democratic processes or imposes substantial
burdens on a major actor in the private sector. Rehearing by a larger number
of judges will help to assure that the judiciary is not overstepping the modest
role it should play in a society governed through representative democracy and
committed to the protection of private property and individual enterprise.

